THE PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE ACT OF 1915.
III.
A year ago I the writer published an article on the Pennsylvania Practice Act of 1915. The present article is intended to
supplement and amplify the former in the light of all of the
cases reported up to January io,1917, and of a number of unreported cases, for reference to which the writer is indebted to
judges of the county courts. 2
The fact that comparatively few cases under the act have
been reported may indicate that it.is working well in actual practice, but the general opinion of the bench is rather critical, and
some judges are quite outspoken in their demand for its repeal.
There is no doubt that many of the sections of the act are
unskillfully and loosely drawn and that it will take some time
before the practice will be reasonably well settled. It is a weakness of all practice acts that they must leave much to judicial
interpretation, and rules of court must be adopted to supply
deficiencies since no legislature can anticipate all of the problems
of practice that arise. In view of the fact that comparatively
few practice problems reach the appellate courts,3' uniformity of
practice will be long delayed, and as each one of the courts in
the fifty-six judicial districts in Pennsylvania is independent, it
'64 U. oF PA. Lw REviEw, p. 223. For convenience of reference; the act
is herein discussed in the order of its sections under appropriate captions.
-The writer desires especially to acknowledge his obligation to the following judges for copies of unreported decisions as well as suggestions and
expressions of views on various sections of the act: Hon. T. F. Bailey, Huntingdon County; Hon. T. J. Baldridge, Blair County; Hon. Norris S. Barratt, Philadelphia County; Hon. S. F. Channell, Tioga County; Hon. Charles
Corbet, Jefferson County; Hon. L W. Doty, Westmoreland County; lion.
William C. Ferguson, Philadelphia County; Hon. T. D. Finletter, Philadelphia County; Hon. H. A. Fuller, Luzerne County; Hon. XV. R. Gillan, Franklin County; Hon. J. F. E. Hause, Chester County; Hon. J.A. Mcllvain, Washington County; Hon. J.F. Miller, Montgomery County; Hon. J. W. Ray,
Greene County; Hon. U. P. Rossiter, Erie County; Hon. W. -H. Ruppel,
Somerset County; Hon. S. B. Sadler, Cumberland County; Hon. John D.
Shafer, Allegheny County; Hon. G. G. Sloan, Clarion County; Hon. S. J.
Strauss, Luzerne County; Hon. H. XV. Whitehead, Lycoming County; Hon.
F. W. Whittelsey, Erie County; Hon. J.B. Woodward, Luzerne County.
Thus far no cases interpreting the Practice Act have reached the appellate courts.
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may adopt rules of court covering matters of practice not laid
down in the act; this, together with the normal disagreement
of courts in matters of interpretation, will in a few years result
in diversity instead of uniformity of practice.4 If the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania had been endowed by this act with power
to make rules of practice for its proper enforcement, this result
might have been prevented, but under section 23, the power
already inherent in the common pleas court to make such rules
as they deem advisable for the proper enforcement of this act,
is specifically given to them. It has been suggested that even
though the State Supreme Court may be permitted to make general rules of practice, the constitutional right of the independent
common pleas courts to make rules of their own cannot thus be
taken away. The writer is of the opinion that a sufficient
answer to this objection has been given by Professor Roscoe
Pound, to whose article on the subject reference is here made.a
The great desideratum in rules of practice is flexibility, so
that they can readily be molded to meet all contingencies in
actual practice. This is impossible in legislative rules, which
can only be amended every two years, whereas rules of court
can be adopted, amended, and repealed by the court as the exigencies of practice require.
Some sections of the act should be amended, a~nd some of
the undesirable features that should be eliminated or changed
are discussed in the following pages.
APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE.

Although section i limits the scope of the act to actions
brought in the court of common pleas, it has been decided that
the procedure applies as well to actions brought before a justice
of the peace and subsequently brought into the court of common
'In 1896 Alexander Simpson, of the Philadelphia Bar, published a compilation of rules of the courts of common pleas of Pennsylvania in the Second Annual Report of the Pennsylvania Bar Association, pages 281 to 689.
Over 40o pages of this report contain the rules of the common pleas and
illustrate abundantly the variety of methods of procedure in the different
county courts.
'In an article entitled "Regulation of Judicial Procedure by Rules of
Court," to Ill. Law Review 163 (x916).
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pleas by appeal.' The court took the view that an appeal from
the judgment of a justice of the peace is only one of several
ways of bringing such action in the court of common pleas. But
though the result of this decision may be desirable, its logic is
questionable. An appeal brings the case into the court of common pleas and the action was originally brought in the court
of the justice of the peace. The result sought may be attained
by the simpler and more satisfactory method of a rule of court
such as now exists in Philadelphia, 7 Luzerne, 8 Somerset 8 and
other counties.
ExcrPTiox OF LIBEL AND SLANDER.
The title of the act as well as section i,except from its
provisions the actions for libel and slander, the pleadings in
which remain as heretofore, i. e., a common-law declaration and
pleas. There is no apparent reason for this exception 10 and
the affidavit of defense which by the act has been made a pleading of such dignity as to supersede all pleas, demurrers, and bills
of particulars might vell have been used as a proper substitute
'Richey v. Maurer, 12 Schuylkill 337; 64 Pittsburgh 672; 44 County
Court Reports 6oo.
'Philadelphia Rule 74.
*The writer is indebted to Judge S. J. Strauss for a copy of the Luzerne
Rule, see note 135, infra.
* The writer is indebted to Judge V. H. Ruppel for a copy of the Somerset Rule:
"Sec. i. An appeal by a defendant from the judgment of a justice of the
peace having been filed in the prothonotary's office, the plaintiff may at any
time thereafter file his statement of claim in the same form and manner as
provided for in original actions by the Practice Act Nineteen Fifteen, P. L.
483; and the further proceedings shall in all respects conform to 'the provisions of said act of assembly. If- the plaintiff do not file his statement of
claim, the defendant may at any time rule him to file his statement and proceed as in other cases.
"Sec. 2. When the plaintiff appeals from the judgment of a jbstice of
the peace, he shall file his transcript or within twenty days thereafter his
statement of claim, in the form prescribed by said Practice Act Nineteen
Fifteen, and the subsequent proceedings shall in all respects conform to said
act of assembly.
"Sec. 3. For default of any conditions imposed by this rule, either
party may move for judgment for same amount as the justice's judgment,
together with costs and interest!'
1°64 U. OF P.*. Lw REvi'w 233.
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for the pleas of "not guilty" and "justification." " It is difficult if not impossible to see why the defendant should not state
in his affidavit of defense," ' that he did not utter the defamatory
words or publisfi the libel, or that he did utter the words but
that they constituted a privileged communication, or that the
words are not false and malicious, or that the publication was
proper for public information or investigation. The latter defenses should be coupled with a statement of circumstances under
-which the words were spoken or published so that the question
of privilege or justification 1- might he determined in linine
as a question of law.
Under the English practice 14 there is a practical equivalent
to the affidavit of defense in the plea and particulars. The plea
now commonly approved is in the following form:
"In so far as the said words consist of allegations of fact,
they are true in substance and in fact; in so far as they consist of
expressions of opinion, they are fair comments made in good faith
and without malice upon the said facts which are matters of public
interest." '=
The court has power to require particulars to be ordered
of the allegations of fact which are relied on by the defendant
in support of his plea."6 With these and other precedents 17
"'The late Judge Robert Ralston, of Philadelphia, one of the draftsmen
of the act, in an address before the Pittsburgh Law Club, 72 Legal Intelligencer 824, offers the following explanation for the retention of the old
procedure: "It does not apply to actions for libel and slander in which the
plea is 'not guilty' or 'justification.' Under the former plea the defendant
cannot show that the defamatory words constituting the alleged slander or
libel are true; if he wishes to assert their truth, which is a complete defense,
he must plead 'justification.' As the defenses which may be set up under
each of these pleas are well settled, and as the plea of 'justification' if not
proved is some evidence of malice and will always tend tq aggravate damages, it was thought better to leave these actions as they are and not change
the existing practice. They were, therefore, omitted from the scope of the
act."
"2Under existing practice an affidavit of defense is not required, but may
be filed in lieu of a plea of "not guilty," and both pleas "not guilty" and
"justification" may be pleaded together. Ferber v. Gazette & Bulletin Publ.
Ass'n, 212 Pa. 367 (i9O5).
"Under Act April zi, xgot, P. L 74.

'140. 1g, R. 6.

"Lord Penrhyn v. The Licensed Victuallers' Mirror, 7 Times Reports i

(t&)0).

"Digby v. Financial News Limited, i K. B. 502 (1907).

Wrhere a gen-
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before them, the draftsmen of the act might well have included
the actions for slander and libel in their procedural scheme,
thereby helping to promote uniformity instead of diversity in
practice. It would have resulted in supplanting the verbose
pedantry of the declaration for a concise and summary statement of claim, and ought to have resulted also in the abolition
of the "innuendo" by requiring in all statements of claim a
recital of the exact manner in whcl the slander affects the
standing or reputation of the plaintiff and whether specifically
in his vocation or as a public official.' 8
ABOLITION OF DEM URRER.

Did the legislature by section 4 intend to abolish all demurrers or do the words of the second part of the section limit
the effect of the first to the demurrer to the statement of claim? '1
Under the former practice. the statement of claim was the only
pleading attacked by demurrer. The attack on the affidavit of
defense was always by rule for judgment. whether the affidavit
of defense, as under the Philadelphia rules :" was considered a
pleading or, as in the opinion of the Supreme Court.2 merely
eral charge of misconduct is made by the defendant, as for instance that the
plaintiff is a swindler and defendant justifies he must in his plea give specific
instances of conduct justifying such a description, and these must be pleaded
with sufficient particularity to inform the plaintiff precisely what are the facts

to be tried and what is the charge made against him. See Annual Practice
for 1914, page 326.

Defendant must set out in his plea the facts and cir-

cumstances on which he will rely as rendering the occasion privileged. Annual
Practice, p. 342.

" Under the Practice Act of i912 of New Jersey, section 3, there is but
one form of civil action in the courts of common pleas called an "action at
law." No distinction is made between actions cx contractu and actions e.r
delicto, and no exceptions in favor of actions for libel and slander.
" A distinguished judge of one of our country courts writes in advocacy
of these changes, adding "pleading having become a lost art there are very
few lawyers among the younger men sufficiently alert to protect their clients
on these high technicalities. I think this rather unfortunate, but with the
tendency of the times it casts a slur upon the administration of justice to

have suitors thrown out of couit for reasons like these."
"Judge Wanner says tersely "The Practice Act of 1915 sweeps away practically all that remained of the ancient forms of pleading after the passage
of the Procedure Act of 1887, except in cases of libel and slander, to which
' York 20o; s. c.
the recent act does not apply." Miller v. Penna. R. R. Co., -6 Lehigh 407.
" Rules 54-61.
' Muir v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 203 Pa. 338.
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an interloping nondescript having a peculiar and special function
but not being recognized as a pleading. Under the present act
that portion of the affidavit of defense which sets up new matter
by way of set-off or counter-claim is in effect a defendant's
statement of claim and is so denominated in section 15. How
shall this portion of the affidavit of defense be attacked by the
plaintiff? Under section 4 matters of law which could have
been set tip by demurrer may now be set up in the affidavit of
defense and as the plaintiff's reply is considered an affidavit of
defense to the defendant's set-off or counter-claim, it would
seem to be proper practice to attack the latter in plaintiff's reply.
In an .unreported decision of one of the Philadelphia
courts 22 the opinion was expressed orally that section 4 abolishes not only the demurrer to statement but also the rule for
more specific statement of claim, but the practice in Schuylkill
County - 3 is contra. The decision of the Philadelphia court is
open to criticism. Mr. Justice Mitchell 24 drew attention to the
fundamental difference between the demurrer and the rule for
more specific statement, and, since .the act abolishes demurrers
only it is very difficult to justify the ruling of the Philadelphia
court. The rule for more specific statement. performs a useful
and special function utterly different from that of an affidavit
of defense. The mere desire for uniformity in practice has
already produced the abnormality of requiring a defendant to
swear in his affidavit of defense to the legal insufficiency of the
plaiiitiff's statement and, this decision would carry the principle
still farther and require the defendant to swear that the plaintiff's statement is not sufficiently specific. Perhaps this is a desirable result, but it always creates difficulty when things that
are essentially different are called by the same name. The affidavit of defense is now the vehicle for stating the defendant's
actual defense to the plaintiff's claim, his defense of set-off or
Katzenberg v. Oberndorf, C. C. P. NO. 4, Sept. Term, 19T6, No. 77i.
"Richey v. Maurer, supra, note 6; Mountain City Water Co. v. Harleigh
Co., r2 Schnyl. 377 (!9Y6).,
11Bradley v. Potts, i55 Pa. 418 (1893).
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counter-claim, his attack on the plaintiff's statement because it
does not set up a good cause of action and also because it is not
stated with sufficient clearness and particularity. A few years
ago the affidavit of defense was not even a pleading; now it
absorbs the functions of affilavit of defense, plea, notice of special matter, bill of particulars,-" demurrer, and rule for more
specific statement of claim. But as soon as we assign to this
pleading so many different functions we must give it, unofficially
at least, a number of different names. The tendency to name
a thing according to its functions will not be checked by mere
legislative enactments or rules of court. The bar, for example,
will not long go on calling this pleading, in one of its important
new functions an "affidavit of defense by way of demurrer" or
"'inlieu of demurrer." It is sometimes called a "quasi-demurrer."
The Pittsburgh bar with the approval of the bench is calling it
a "statutory demurrer." This is a good name and precisely defines at least one of the functions of this hybrid affidavit of defense. Other names will no doubt in time be invented and used
until we shall have the different functions of the affidavit of
defense represented by a number of different names. What
then will be the value of having all these things done in* one
form? The mere unscientific conglomeration of functions by
means of a single pleading is not a step toward uniformity or
real procedural reform. All the dicta of legislatures cannot
make a demurrer anything but a demurrer, nor can they, by saying so, make a demurrer and an affidavit of defense the same
thing. The only result of such legislation is to create confusion
where before there was clarity and to invite courts to say, as
was said in the Philadelphia case, that a rule for more specific
statement shall now also be called an affidavit of defense. It
may be that "demurrer" is not a good name or that it is no
longer in good repute notwithstanding its service for centuries.
Then let the demurrer be called something else, if it must be,
but surely not by a name which is well known as that of a procedural step having a function entirely different from that of
"Sturtevant v. Regan, 64 Pitts. 715 (igi6) ; S. c. 34 Lanc. 53.
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a demurrer. It seems that the trouble may be traced to the
oversight of the draftsmen of the act of the fact that in the
English procedure which was their model the demurrer-and the
defense are set forth in the same paper.!"' Instead of copying this provisim and thus allowing or rather compelling a
defendant to denmur and plead at the same time they split up the
procedure and required two affidavits of defense to be filed,
first, one which is a demurrer and nothing else and then a second
one, which is a plea and particulars, or as we would call it an
affidavit of defense on the merits.
CONTENT AND

FORM

OF PLEADINGS.

In explanation of the meaning of this section, Judge Ralston -',1recommended that the pleading should be set forth in
clear, short, positive sentences avoiding circumlocution. Instead
of using participial phrases, each statement should be averred
positively. For instance, instead of averring that defendant
being a street car company operating a line of trolleys, etc., did
so and so, the statement should be that the defendant is a street
car company and on the da in question operated the car which
caused the injury. If documents are referred to, they should
le quoted exactly as written, for instance in an action on a
policy which was to become void "if the assured shall die by his
own hand," the defendant insurance company should not aver
that the insured "killed himself" or "committed suicide" but
that the "assured died by his own hand."
Furthermore, only material facts should be stated and all
unnecessary allegations and details omitted. It is a well-known
fact. testified to by a number of the judges of this state, that
the tendency of the bar to prolixity in pleading still persists and
is overcome with great difficulty. It is probably a characteristic
of the weak rather than the strong lawyer, of the one who is
not quite sure of the exact legal effect of his statements and
therefore seeks safety in a cloud of words. Every fact that must
' Annual Practice,

191S,

pp. 424-427, and see forms, ibid., p. 1489.

'See Address of Judge Ralston, cited in note

11,

supra.
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be either admitted by the other side or proved in order to establish the party's case is material 28 and the rule applies as well
to the statement of a counter-claim or a set-off as to other
pleadings.2 9
Other faults frequently commented on by the bench are the
old trick of trying to forestall the defense in the statement of
claim, and the recital of obligations and duties and failure to
perform them. The latter is entirely unnecessary and indeed
directly contrary to the provision of section 5 which forbids the
pleading of inferences or conclusions of law." The rule laid
down in section 5, that every pleading shall be divided into paragraphs, numbered consecutively, each of which shall contain but
one material allegation, has been frequently enforced and in
several reported cases 11pleadings faulty in this respect have.
been stricken from the record.
'See Address of Judge Ralston, cited in note ix, supra.
Beck v. Kauffman, _6 D. R. x (igx6).
Delaney v. Chester, 14 Del. 49 (ig6) ; s. c. 6 Lehigh 405; 64 Pitts. 293,
In this case the court prescribes the form of statement of claim as follows:
i. The city of Chester is a municipal corporation, being a city of the
third class.
2. Seventh Street, running eastwardly from Welsh Street, was a public
street of said city on February 26, 1914.
3. On February 26, 1914, there was a paved sidewalk on the south side of
Seventh Street running eastwardly from Welsh Street.
4. On February 22, 1914, snow existed on said sidewalk.
5. This snow became hardened and remained until February 27, 1914.
6. On February 2-6, 1914, at about ix o'clock A. M., the said plaintiff was

walking on said sidewalk and fell.
7. At the time of the said fall the plaintiff became injured by a cut on her
head, injury to both arms, and internal injuries accompanied with pain and
suffering.
8. The said injuries have continued until the present time.
9. The plaintiff has expended money for medicines and medical attendance in connection with said injuries.
A & B,
Attorneys for plaintiff.
Delaware County, ss.:
Elizabeth Delaney, the plaintiff above named, being duly affirmed according to law, says that the allegations in the foregoing statement are true.
Affirmed and subscribed before me this
day of
, 1916.
To the within defendant:
You are required to file an affidavit of defense to this statement of claim
within 15 days from the service thereof.
(Names of the attorneys and their addresses.)
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DEFENSE BY EXECUTORS, ETC.

An old rule of court of Philadelphia 3 2 and other counties
required an affidavit of defense by executors, administrators,
guardians, committees and others sued in a representative capacity. The purpose of this rule was stated by the late Judge
Michael Arnold as follows, "itis to enable the plaintiff to obtain
judgment where there is neither a defense nor even a desire to
delay the plaintiff as in suits upon mortgages or ground rent
deeds."I'l This rule of court required the executor to swear that
lie believes there is a just and*legal defense. In the opinion of
the Cotrt of Common Pleas of Northinpton County 34 the rule
was held to be undesirable and was rescinded on the ground that
if the executor had a belief on the subject he might be mistaken
"Cunfer v. Smith, iS Luzerne 400 (1916) ; 64 Pitts. 572; 14 Del. 166; Zullinger v. Grebe, 33 Lane. 401 ; s. c. 14 Del. igo. Hackney v. Gorley, 64 Pitts.
24 (oQ16): s. c. 33 Lanc. 2--o; 25 D. R: 4.3; 44 C. C. 273, decided that if the

statement of claim contains succinct and consecutively numbered paragraphs.
the mere fact that it commences with a brief introductory sentence setting
forth in general terms what the case is about, so that the formal parts of the
sentence may be better understood, is not a violation of this section of the
act. In the two cases above cited leave was granted to file a new statement
of
thirty days.
. claim
"Anwithin
affidavit of defense shall be required from executors, administrators, guardians, committees, and others sued in a representative capacity:
Provided. that an affidavit by the defendant in said cases, stating that .he has
made diligent inquiry, and has not been able to obtain sufficient information
to enable him to set forth particularly the nature and character of the
defense, but that he believes there is a just and legal defense, shall be deemed
a sufficient compliance with this rule." Adopted March 7, 1893.
="Under the old rule, judgment could not be obtained except for want
of a plea, or, if a plea was filed, until the case could be reached on the trial
list and disposed of there, thus resulting in ruinous delay and loss of trust
funds invested for widows and orphans. Authority to make such rule may
be found in Dixon v. Sturgeon. 6 S. & R. 25, in which Judge Duncan said: 'I
can see nothing in reason, from the representative character of an executor
or administrator, to distinguish it from a suit by or against a person in his
own right. The executor or administrator is deprived of no privilege, of no
defense, which he possessed by the common-law mode of proceeding. He has
full time to make his defense after statement filed; he is not and cannot be
taken by surprise. If his defense consists of a plea to the original demand,
he has sufficient time to acquire knowledge and to shape it so as to meet his
case.' And in Charlton v. Allegheny City, i Grant's Cases ao8, the court
against a minor defended by her guardian: *He has the cussaid. in a stilt
tody of her property and is quite able to ascertain all the facts relating to the
validity of the lien as if the property were his own. If he can discover no
fact that will justify an affidavit of defense, he would find some trouble in
making an available defense before a jury.'" 32 W. N. C. 36.
National Bank v. Detwiller, 8 D. R. 513 (1899).
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and ought not to be compelled to swear to such belief. Section
7 of the Practice Act requires the executor, in addition to the
statement of his belief that there is a defense, to set forth "the
facts upon which he bases his belief." If he does so, he is relieved from the responsibility of mistake in his belief. If the
facts in the opinion of the court do not justify his belief, judgment may be given in favor of the plaintiff. If, on the other
hand, the court finds that the belief is justified by the facts stated
or that the statement is of suspicious circumstances which raise
a reasonable doubt as to the bona fides of the plaintiff's claim,
the court should refuse judgment and let the case go to a jury,
thus requiring the plaintiff to prove his case in open court subject to cross-examination. If such a claim were presented at
the audit of the executor's account in the orphans' court, ample
opportunity would be given to the executor to inquire into the
good faith of the claim and the claimant would be put to his
proofs. The common pleas court, therefore, in an action against
the executor should not permit the plaintiff to enjoy a higher
right than would.be granted to him in the orphans' court which
is especially organized to consideir claims against decedents'
estates. The burden in such case obviously should be on the
plaintiff to show why the claim was not pressed for satisfaction
during the lifetime of the debtor. Under this section of the
act, therefore, it is submitted that the defendant executor need
not state facts to justify his belief, but merely the facts upon
which he bases his belief, and if the court is convinced of the
defendant's good faith-and suspects the good faith of the plaintiff, it should send the case to a jury, as the defendant has complied with the technical requirements of the act. A case in
which this question arose was considered by the Court of Common Pleas No. 5,of Philadelphia County,. 5 The defendant's
executors filed an affidavit of defense denying the indebtedness
but failed to set forth their defense in language sufficiently specific, so that if such an affidavit had been filed by the decedent
in a suit against him, the court would have given judgmetic for
McGlinn Distiling Co. v. Dervin,

25

D. R. 341 (1916).
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want of a sufficient affidavit of defense. But after two arguments, the court refused to give judgment on the ground that
the claim was a stale one and no explanation had been offered
by the plaintiff why he had made no effort to collect it during
the lifetime of the defendant's testator.
DEFENSE BY MUNICIPALITIES.

By an early act of assembly -1"municipal corporations were
expressly exempted from the obligation imposed on other defendants to file affidavits of defense in certain cases. After the Procedure Act of 1887 3 was passcd, the question arose whether
this exemption of municipalities was thereby repealed. It was
held by Judge Allison of the Court of Common Pleas No. I, of
Philadelphia County, that it is clear there is no express repeal
and a reasonable interpretation of the Procedure Act of 1887
leads to the conclusion that there is no implied repeal, and the
exemption of municipal corporations from filing affidavits of defense still continues.-" There is nothing in section 7 of the
Practice Act which should change the law in this respect. The
general rule against implied repeal of acts of assembly would
apply and the exemption of municipalities from filing an affidavit of defense would still continue except as modified by the
Act of May 3,

1909,

P. L. 39439
SPECIFIC DENIAL.

Up to the time of the passage of the Practice Act of 1915
there were no Pennsylvania decisions as to the extent to which
a specific denial must go. The English rules of practice required
"That the party pleading to an allegation of fact must make it
Act of April 21, 1858, P. L. 387.
25, 1887, P. L. 271.
"Malone v. Philadelphia, i32 Pa.

"Act of May

-o9 (t8go). On appeal the Supreme
Court decided the case on other grounds. In Bethlehem City Water Co. v.
South Bethlehem Borough, 14 D. R. 720 (i9o5), Judge Scott of Northampton County followed the decision of Judge Allison.
"See also Acts of Assembly of April 26, 1893, P. L. 261 March z, i9o9,
P. L. 394; May 8, 1x13, P. L. 172. The question was raised but not decided in
Ahrens v. Reading, 8 Berks 246 (1916).
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perfectly clear how much of it he admits and how nmuch of it
he denies." He must not deny en bloc everything alleged against
him. A defendant must not plead that "he denies specifically
every allegation contained in the statement of claim." Still, it
is not necessary to write out every sentence in the statement of
claim and traverse it in detail. It is sufficient when dealing with
matters of inducement or any other allegations which do not go
to the gist of the action, to plead that "the defendant denies each
of the allegations contained

in paragraph

.

.

. "

But

when the pleader goes to those allegations which are of the gist
of the action he must be more precise. He must plead "the defendant never agreed as alleged" or "never nmade such representation as is alleged in paragraph

.

.

.

of the statement of

claim." 40 In a recent case under the Practice Act, decided by
Judge Fuller of Luzerne County, 4' the statement of claim contained eight paragraphs, the affidavit of defense denied generally
the facts set forth in seven of these paragraphs. In a later
paragraph, the affidavit of defense substantially answered the
pith of the statement, but it was held insufficient because the
plaintiff is entitled to have a specific denial of every allegation
in his statement of claim. 42 But the rule as to the extent of the
specific denial has its limitation. If -the defendant has no means
of knowledge and, therefore, is unable to answer specifically,
the general and proper rule is stated by Judge Barratt of Philadelphia as follows:
"Averment of ignorance and demand of proof is insufficient
where the defendant has knowledge or means of knowledge, but
where knowledge is beyond his means, then such averment is
equivalent to a denial of the allegation in the statement." 43
"Adkins v. North Metropolitan Tramway Co., 63 L J. Q. B. .361 0893);

Annual Practice for 194, pp. 344-45; Rassam v. Budge, i Q. B. 57i (1893).

" Scranton Flour & Grain Co. v. Maier, iSLuzerne 466; s.c. 33 Lanc.
14 Del. 197; s. c. 64 Pitts. 695.
' J3nthis case plaintiff took a rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense but the court refused to make the rule absolute
404; S. C.

and suspended it for fifteen days in order to enable the defendant to file
a supplemental affidavit of defense.
"Beck v. Kauffman. jupra, note 29. See also Pennsylvania Railroad
Co. v. Dreyfus, 25 D. R. 265 (1916). and Carnell v. Gordon, 25 D. R.

i89 (j916).
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STATEMENT OF CLAIM.

Section 9 proviles that "in actions on contracts it shall state
whether the contract was oral or in writing." This should not
be left to inference. The general tendency seems to be to assume that unless a contract is stated to be in writing, in which
event a copy of it must be attached under the provision of section 5, it may be presumed to be oral. The act specifically requires a statement that it is oral, if that be the case. Failure
to comply with this provision of the act may result in an order
to strike the pleading from the record under section 21. As a
44
rule such defect may be cured by amendment.
Section 9 further provides that the statement of claim "shall
be sworn to by the plaintiff or some person having knowledge of
the facts." Under the former practice. this was not uniformly
required. Under the present act, a statement of claim must be
sworn to in an action of trespass as well as of assumpsit, 45 and
if not sworn to will be stricken off under the provisions of section 21.4 1 If the plaintiff himself does not swear to the state-,
inent of claim, the affidavit may be made by his agent or attorney
or any other person "having knowledge of the facts." The
affidavit should in such cases state the reason why it is not made
by the plaifitiff himself and that a real disability exists which
prevents him from making it. The circumstances causing the
disability should also be stated.4 7 Cases relating to the character of the allegations necessary to be made by a stranger when
making an affidavit of defense on behalf of the defendant apply
as well to the case of a stranger making an affidavit to a statement of claim on behalf of a plaintiff.48 In an opinion filed by
"Ballora v. Hayes, unreported, Court of Common Pleas, Westmoreland
452; Curtis v. Bortree, 17 Lack. 259; s. c.

County. August Term, 1916, No.
64 Pitts. 752 (x9r6).

'Weber v. Consolidated Ice Co., 64 Pitts. 223 (1916). Where the
affidavit is made by an officer of a corporation plaintiff, it is an affidavit by
the corporation itself, hence bv the plaintiff. Phila. & Reading Coal &
Iron Co. v. Stambaugh, unreported, Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland
County, September Term i916, No. 314Sorrick v. Schutz. 14 Del. 1Ot (1916), s. c. .j3 Lane. 4o.

"Corosu v. Allegheny River Mining Co.. unreported, Court of Common

Pleas, Jefferson County, April Term,

i916, No. 234.

" Safety Banking and Trust Co. v. Conwell, 28 Pa. Super. Ct. 237;
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Judge Corbet of Jefferson County, 4 it was held that an affidavit
to the statement of claim made by the plaintiff's attorney averring, that "the plaintiffs are absent from the county and by reason thereof cannot make affidavit to this statement. Deponent
is well acquainted with the facts of this case," is insufficient.
Furthermore the deponent averred that "the matters set forth
in the foregoing statement as a basis of claim are true" but he
did not set out his means of knowledge or whether his averment
was upon actual personal knowledge or upon information, and
this was also held to be insufficient. The court pointed out particularly that the averments of the attorney that "he is well acquainted with the facts" is not equivalent to an averment that
lie "has knowledge of the facts" as required by section 9 of the
Act.
Under section 12 relating to the affidavit of defense, it isprovided that the affidavit of defense "shall be sworn to by the
defendant or some person having knowledge of the facts." This
provision being in terms precisely similar to that relating to the
statement of claim should receive the same interpretation. The
rules relating to this matter are thus substantially summarized
by Judge Corbet in the opinion above cited, first, a sufficient
reason must be set forth why the plaintiff or defendant cannot
or does not in person make the affidavit. Second, that the affiant is authorized either expressly or impliedly to make the affidavit for the plaintiff or defendant and that he makes it for him.
Third, that the affiant (a) has actual personal knowledge of the
facts set forth, (b) deposes upon information given or sought
for and obtained by him and that he believes the facts of which
he was thus informed to be true and that the source of his information of the facts upon which his belief rests is as follows
(setting it forth), and that the affiant expects the plaintiff or
Bushong v. Edwards. .._ Pa. Super. Ct. .376: Albright v. Fritz, 21 Pa. C. C.
444; Crine v. Wallace. i W. N. C. 20.3: Snvder v. Haas. 8 Del. Co. R. 35:
Hirst, Executor, v. Core. 26 Mong. Co. "r.212: Shaw v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co..,16 Lanc. L. R. 2F.: Schrode v. Moyer,. 6 Luzerne
I- R. Rep. ii: Bumardner v. Morris. 42 P. L. J. 3;.; Creighton v. National Safe Co. to D. R. 6oo; Hutchinson v. Woodwell. 107 Pa. 5o0; Johnson v. Smith, 158 Pa. 568.
"Corosu v. Allegheny River Mining Co., supra, note 47.
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defendant to be able at the trial to prove the facts alleged, Judge
Corbet states particularly that the rules heretofore laid down as
to the verification of the affidavit of defense are now, under section 9 of the Practice Act, applicable as well to the verification
of the plaintiff's statement of claim. "If these principles apply
in case of an affidavit of defense made by a stranger in connection with the additional qualifications heretofore mentioned, I
am unable to see why in connection with the same qualifications
they should not apply in case of a statement of claim made by a
stranger." The general rule thus laid down seems to be a salutary one, and tends to promote uniformity in practice.
ENDORSEMENT OF STATEMENT OF CLAIM.

Where the statement of claim is not endorsed as required
by section io of the act, it will either in an action of assumpsit
or trespass be stricken off on motion of defendant. 50
PLAINTIFF ASKING FOR AN ACCOUNT.

In the article previously published 5 the writer ventured to
criticize sections I I and 19 and to suggest doubt as to their
meaning and constitutionality. These views have been at least
in part confirmed by a number of extrajudicial opinions received
from judges of various county courts. In an opinion by Judge
Mcllvaine of Vashington County,5 2 sections II and 19 are referred to but their scope is not considered and a reading of 'this
opinion would indicate that the court considered their meaning
- Weber v. Consolidated Ice Co., supra. note 45: Zullinger v. Grebe,
supra, note 3i. The endorsement of the address of the attorney or of the
plaintiff as required by this section of the act is essential. Curtis v. Bortree.
supra. note -4. In the case of Walsh v. James. unreported, Court of Common Pleas, Luzerne County, October Term, 914, No. 153o, Judge Strauss
held that a pleading endorsed with the name of the attorney at Hazleton,
Pa., was a sufficient endorsenient of an address in a city no larger than
Hazleton. where the attorney was well known and all of the members of
the bar knew one another and the location of their offices. Whether the
same practice might be approved in a city like Philadelphia or Pittsburgh
is doubtful
s164 U. op PA. LAW REviEW 25t-254.
'3'Masitis v. St. Vincent B. & P. Society. 44 County Court Reports, 289

(i6); s. c. 64 Pitts. 255.
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rather obscure. There is a suggestion that an action of assumpsit might lie to recover a balance due upon an account rendered
or "to be rendered." This, however, must be taken to be mere
dictum or perhaps a slip of the judicial pen for as indicated
heretofore, "' - assumpsit does not lie in cases in which the defendant must account. If an action of account render is commenced and plaintiff desires to change his action to assumpsit
to recover a balancc due upon an account rendered, authority
may be found for such proceeding,14 but it is submitted that no
such change of action can be permitted from account render to
assumpsit to recover a balance upon an account "to be rendered."
The question of the constitutionality of the act on account
of the inclusion of sections ii and 19 is raised but not decided
in a case in the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County in an
opinion filed by Judge Ray. 55
'64 U. oF PA. LAw Rrxirw 253, and case cited there in footnote i12.
"Act May io,1871, P. L. 2-65, as follows: "in all actions pending or
hereafter to be brought in the several courts of this commonwealth, said
courts shall have power, in any stage of the proceedings, to permit an
amendment or change in the form of action, if the same shall be necessary
for a proper decision of the cause upon its merits, the party applying to
pay all costs up to the time of amendment, and the cause to he continued
to the next court if desired by the adverse party." See also Wright v.
Hopkins. 3 D. R. 240 (1894).
' ennant v. Richill Township, unreported, Court of Common Pleas,
Greene County, June Term, 1916, No. 6. The portion of the opinion of the
court on this point is as follows: "The defendant, in its affidavit of defense, sets out and avers, hiter alia, () that the return day of the writ
of summons and the day on which it is required to file its affidavit of
defense are not the same. and that, therefore, the whole proceeding is
void; (2) that the Practice Act of 1915. is unconstitutional in that the
title of said act does not clearly express the subjects contained therein,
and contains more than one subiect: and because, by sections i1 and ig
of said act, it is sought to bring within the scope of an action of assumpsit
actions, which heretofore, were prosecuted by action of account render, or
by bill in equity; and because it provides that the plaintiff may require
an accounting from the defendant, hut does not provide that the defendant
may require, in a proper case, an accounting from the plaintiff: and because the title to said act gives no intimation that such change in the law
was contemplated. . . . The defendant's contention that the Practic6
Act, 1915, in its entirety, is unconstitutional, is based for the most part
on the allegation that sections it and ig of said act are unconstitutional,

and that, therefore, the whole act must fall. These two sections provide
that the plaintiff, in case he makes certain averments in his statement, may
ask the defendant to account to him. We are not concerned, however, in
the case at bar. with the constitutionality of these two sections. This is
an action of trespass in which the defendant seeks to recover damages for
the death of her husband and no accounting is asked for. Even if the
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VANT OF AN AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENSE BEFORE
TuE RETI'RN DAY OF THE WRIT.

Section 12 of the act requires the defendant to file an affidavit of defense within fifteen days from the day when the
statement was served upon him. and, in accordance with section 17. in actions of assumpsit, the prothonotary may enter
judgment for want of such affidavit. The question now arises,
when may such judgment be entered? Under the Procedure Act
two sections complained of should be declared unconstitutional it by no
means follows that the whole act is unconstitutional. Part of an act not
within the subject stated in the title, may be unconstitutional, leaving the
rest to stand. Mauch Chunk v. McGee, Sr Pa. 433. Agnew, C. J., delivering
the opinion, says: 'It issettled in this state that a part of an act not
within the subject stated in the title. may be declared unconstitutional.
leaving the portion within the title to stand: Dorsey's Appeal, 22 P. F.
Smith 192; Allegheny Home's Appeal, 27 Id. 7-; Smith v. McCarthy, 6 Id.
.g; Commonwealth v. Green. 8 Id. 234, ...
It is the duty of the court
to reconcile the different parts of a law. if it can be reasonably done, rather
than to declare an - part void, and thus frustrate the legislative action.
. . . It is a cardinal rule that all statutes are to be so construed as to
sustain rather than ignore them: to give them operation if the language
will permit, instead of treating them as meaningless: and I may add, or
treating them as invalid: HIoward's Appeal, o P. F. Smith 344. It is not
the purpose or duty of the court to catch at pretexts to avoid legislation,
where it can be fairly reconciled with the constitution. This has been the
current of decision in this state in many cases: Blood v. Mercelliott, 3
P. F.Smith 391: Case of Church Street. 4 Id. 353: Commonwealth v. Green,
8 Id. 226; . . . In Commonwealth v. Green. Justice Sharswood remarked, that "the intention of the constitutional amendment was to require
that the real purpose of a hill should not be disguised or covered by the.
general words. "and for other purposes." which was formerly so common,
but should be fairly stated: and it must be a clear case to justify a court
in pronouncing an act, or any part of it,
void on this ground.' So itwas
said in Allegheny Home's Appeal: *If the title fairly gives notice of the
subject of the act, so as reasonably to lead to an inquiry into the body of
the bill. it is all that is necessary'
"In the case of Brode v. Philadelphia. 23o Pa. 4.34. Justice Brown. delivering the opinion. says: 'An act of assembly is to be declared void
only when it violates the constitution clearly, palpably, plainly and in such
manner as to leave no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the court passing
upon its constitutionality: Sharpless v.Phila, 2t Pa. 147.'
"The title to the Practice Act. s915. reads: 'An act relating to practice
in the courts of common pleas in actions of assumpsit and trespass, except
actions for libel and slander: prescribing the pleadings and procedure, to
be served therein, and giving the courts power to enforce its provisions.
This title, as it seems to us. in the light of the authorities hereinbefore
cited, is in compliance with that provision of the constitution of the state
which declared that "no hill except general appropriation bills, shall be
passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed
in the title.' The one subiect expressed in the title to the act in question
relates to the practice, in the courts of common pleas, in actions of assumpsit and trespass, except libel and slander, and prescribes the pleadings and
procedure therein. All that is required is that the title fairly gives notice
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of 188 7 ." if the statement was served not less than fifteen days
before the return day of the writ it was the duty of the defendant to file an affidavit of defense on or before the return day,
and no judgment for want of an affidavit of defense could
under this act be taken before the return day of the writ.5 7 The
Practice Act, however, omits all reference to the return day of
the writ, and the question arises whether a plaintiff whose writ
and statement were served more than fifteen days before the
return day, may take judgment for want of an affidavit of
defense on the sixteenth day after the service of the writ and
statement, or whether he must wait until the day after the
return day of the writ."' This question came before Judge Witmer of the United States District Court for the Middle DisAs the action in this case was trestrict of Pennsylvania.5"
pass, the question did not arise upon a rule for judgment for
want of a sufficient affidavit of defense as no such judgment
can be taken in an action of trespass. 0 The plaintiff's summions and statement were served on the defendant on January
twentieth. According to the notice endorsed on the statement,
the affidavit of defense was required to be filed on February
fourth, but according to the mandate of the summons the defendant was not required to appear and answer before Monday,
February twenty-eighth. The defendant took the ground that
the attempt to require him to file an affidavit of defense prior to
of the subiect of the act. so as to reasonably lead to an inquiry into its
body and that, we think, this title does. Foi" reasons heretofore stated
we are not deciding whether the title is sufficient to cover the provisions
of sections ii and io of the act or not. The pleadings in this case do not
properly raise that question."
'Act May 25, 18S7, P. L 27x, See. 4.
:t Weigley v. Teal, 125 Pa. 498 (18Qg); Newhold v. Pennock, j54 Pa.
591 (1893).
'The question is a practical one and might arise either under special
acts of assembly antedating the constitution of 1874 and still controlling
the practice in different counties of the state or under the general Act of
June it, x879, P. L i25. which permits courts to adopt rules to make
their writs returnable to optional weekly return days.
'Watson v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.. i9 Dauphin 2o6 (z9i6); s. c.
25 1). R. io34; s. c. 24 Lanc. 38: 64 Pitts. 432.
"Ellis v. Bnffalo & Lake Frie Traction Co.. unreported, Court of
Common Pleas of Erie County. November Term, x916, No. 52. Opinion
by Judge Whittelsey.
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the return day of the sunimoni was illegal and he moved to quash
the statement of claim. The court held that the contention of
the defendant must, in part. be affirnied and, while refusing to
quash the statement, made an order to set the service of the
statement aside. The court took the broad ground that when
a defendant is summoned to appear on a day certain and there
to answer, he may not also at the same time be required to
answer before such day, and as the Act of 1836 "1 for the commencement of personal actions by summons and providing for
a return (lay',- is not repealed. the Practice Act of 19z5 must
e construed in harmony with it and hence the court concludes
that it was intended by the Practice Act that the summons
should issue aid that "'after the defendant is thereby required
to appear in court he shall proceed as required by the Act of
i915." This opinion is approved by Judge Sadler of CumberIt was argued before him that the notice on the
land County."
statement of claim to file an affidavit of defense is in such
case inoperative and that the statement of claim may not be
served until after the return day. The court held that the statement may be served at the time when the writ issues but no
judgment can be taken for want of an affidavit of defense until
the return day, if the latter is more than fifteen days from the
(late of the service of the writ. The difficulty here indicated
has been recognized in other districts, in some of which the
opinion was unofficially expressed that under the Practice Act
"Act June 13. 1836. P. L. 8. Sec,. 578.
' In 1912, the committee on law reform of the Pennsylvania Bar Association recommended the passage of an act abolishing fixed return days
and making all writs returnable in tenl or fifteen days after service. See
F-ighteenth Annual Report of the Pennsylania Bar Association, page 62. At
an earlier date. in 1896, at the second annual meeting, see report for that
year. page 6o. the committee in recommending the abolition of the fixed
re-turn days state that they were necessary in the old days when the court
was peripatetic and the bar rode on circuit. By analogy to the system
under the equity rules, a change should be made so that an appearance and
answer would have to be entered in law and equity alike in fifteen days
after service. The committee presented the draft of an act on this subject,
which mOt with spirited opposition and was not recommended for passage.
Iut. although the draft of the act was poor, the spirit which inspired it
was correct and should long since have found expression in some approiriate legislative enactment.
' Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co. v. Stambaugh. unreported, Court

of Common Pleas oi Cumberland County. September Term, I9t6, No. 314.
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no summons is necessary to commence an action and that the
Act of 1836 is impliedly repealed and that the proper practice
now is to proceed as in cases under the equity rules. 4 With due
respect to the opinion of both the above learned courts, the
writer is unable to agree with them in their interpretation of the
act. It is submitted that the Practice Act of 1915 does not impliedly'repeal earlier acts of assembly relating to the issuance
of summons and the return day of the writ, but that it does
impliedly repeal these acts in so far as they require the defendant "to answer on the return day." There are now two days
on which the defendant is required to act, first, the return day
of the writ, on or before which an appearance must be entered,
and, second. the fifteenth day after the service of the statement
of claim, on or before which an affidavit of defense must be
filed. If the return day of the writ is prior in time and the
defendant does not appear, judgment may be taken against him
for want of an appearance. If the day when the affidavit of
defense is due is prior in time and the defendant does not file
an affidavit of defense, judgment may be taken against him for
want of such affidavit. In the latter case, the question of a
formal appearance is unimportant- The conflict between the
Act of 1836 and the Practice Act is only on the question of the
time when the defendant must answer, not on the question of
the time when he must appear. As to the time for the answer,
the conflict is irreconcilable and the provisions of the Act of
1915 must be taken to be paramount. A decision in harmony
with this view was rendered by the Supreme Court " in a case
arising under the Replevin Act "6 in which it was held that
" In order to avoid uncertainty a new rule of court was adopted by
Judge Ruppel of the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County in the
following form: "Actions embraced within the first section of the Prac-

tice Act Nineteen Fifteen shall be commenced by writ of summons as here-

tofore, and no copy of plaintiff's statement of claim shall be served on
defendant until after the case has been regularly entered on the continuance docket in the office of the prothonotary. and the copies served on
the defendant shall have endorsed thereon the number and term to which
the case is entered:'
'Griesmer v. Hill. 36 Superior Court 69 (i9o~tl. affirmed by the Stpreme Court in a25 Pa. 545 (1909).
"Act April i9, 19oI, P. L.-88, Sec. 4.
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judgment might be entered against a defendant for want of
an affidavit of defense in replevin proceedings although the
return day fixed in the writ of replevin had not yet occurred:
The writ of replevin. like the writ of summons, directs the
defendant to appear and answer on the return day, but notwithstanding this a judgment prior to the return day of the
writ was held to he properly entered.07 The reasoning of the
court in this case seems to apply with equal force to the case
now under consideration, and it should be held that the legislature intended under the Practice Act that the fifteenth day after
the service of the statement should be considered as an additional return day, a return day not for the purpose of a formal
appearance but for the purpose of filing an affidavit of defense.
To hold otherwise would result, as in the two cases above cited,
in reading into the act a clause or clauses entirely inconsistent
with its purpose, which was to speed the cause, so that, according to Judge Witmer, the plaintiff has no right to serve his
statement until after the return day, or, according to Judge
Sadler. although he may serve the statement before the return
day, he is obliged to give the defendant more than fifteen days
within which to file an affidavit of defense notwithstanding
section 12 of the act. It cannot be presumed that the legislature intended to take the step backward indicated in the opinion
of Judge Witmer nor that it intended to create the
anomalous situation indicated in the opinion of Judge
Sadler. for in the latter case we are driven to either
one of two conclusions, namely, that the defendant has until
the return day to file the affidavit of defense even though that
be more than fifteen days since the date of the service of the
statement. or that the days between the fifteenth day after
service of the statement and the return day are dies non jiridici
'In Griesmer v.1Hill. supra. note 65. the court calls attention to the
fact that the entry of judgment before the return day. is not without
precedent. It may be regarded as well settled for example that under the
Act of 18.36 a rule of reference may he entered and pursued to award and
judgment thereon before the return day of the writ. Fehr v. Reich, 36 Pa.
472 (IS6o).
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during which the defendant should not be permitted to file an
affidavit of defense and the plaintiff noi be permitted to take
judgment for want of such affidavit.
'AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENSE BY A STRANGER.

What was said above '" in considering affidavit to statement of claim by a stranger, applies to the affidavit of defense.
The affiant, if not the defendant himself, must he some person
having knowledge of the facts and this should appear in his
affidavit. In a case in Luzerne County the affidavit was made
on behalf of a defendant insurance company by A B, a member of the firm of B & Co.. insurance brokers, acting as agents
for the defendant. The affidavit alleged that the deponent "as
a member of said firm" had knowledge, etc. This was held
not suficiently definite to indicate that it was not mere hear09

say.

SERVICE OF COPY OF PLEADING.

Section 12 provides that the defendant shall file an affidavit
of defense within fifteen days from the day "when the statement was served upon him." Section 15 provides that the
plaintiff shall file a reply within fifteen days from the day of
..service of the affidavit of defense upon him." The same section provides for a plaintiff's reply "'which shall be served upon
the defendant." No provision is made in -any part of the act
for service of a copy of the pleadings. The question, therefore, arises whether the original statement, affidavit of defense
or reply respectively shall be served on the opposite party or
whether the service of a copy of such pleadings. the original
having been filed in the prothonotary's office, is sufficient. Under
the Procedure Act of 1887,7" provision is specifically made for
the service of a copy of statement of claim. Must it be presumed that by the omission of this provision from the Practice
"Supra. p. 437.
Savitz v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co, unreported. C. C.
P., Luzerne County, October Term, 916, No. 57.
"Act Mfay 25, 1887, P. L 27r.

THE PENVNSYLVANI..4 PRACTICE ACT OF ig5

Act of 1915, the legislature intended that the original statement of claim should be served on the defendant? In order
that there should be a copy of record, it would require that
duplicate originals should be prepared, one to be filed of record
and the other to be served on the defendant. Judge Sadler, of
Cumberland County, 7' was of the opinion that:
"to insist that the original statement must be handed to the defendant would mean that the copy must be lodged in the office of
the prothonotary or that a copy must be served upon the defendant and the original also shown to him and service thereof accepted
and the paper itself returned to the proper office. Clearly this
could not have been the intention of the legislature."
He held that the service of a copy of the statement of claim
on the defendant was sufficient to require him to file an affidavit
of defense. Judge Strauss of Luzerne County reached a similar
conclusion -, stating that:
"it is the original that must he filed in the prothonotarys office
and the service of a copy is a full compliance with the statute,
the purpose of which is not to invent technicalities to make trouble
but to provide a means of giving information to the plaintiff of
the facts and the substance of the affidavit."
Under a decision of Judge Woodward of Luzerne County -1
arising under a practice peculiar to that county under a rule of
court, 4 the defendant's attorney took from the record a copy
of a statement of claim left there for him by the plaintiff and
gave a written acknowledgment of its receipt. No copy of
the statement was actually served on the defendant nor was any
notice served on him or his attorney that the statement had been
,Phila. & Reading Coal & iron Co. v. Stambaugh, supra, note 63.
Walsh v. James, supra,note So.
"Wilkes-Barre Anthracite Coal Co. v. Stipp. unreported, Court of
Common Pleas of Luzerne County, June Term, 1916, No. 285.
' The writer is indebted to Judge Strauss. of Wilkes-Barre, for a copy
of this rule as follows: "A true copy of every statement, declaration, bill
of particulars, answer, affidavit, exception and plea, shall be filed at the
same time and with the original and the filing noted on the record of
the cause, and on the copy by the prothonotary: said copy shall be endorsed
'copy of (name of paper) for (opposite party)'; such copy may be taken
out by said opposite party or his attorney upon his receipting for the same
on record, or by paper filed, provided that the plaintiff may take a copy
of his statement for service with the writ, and the fact of such taking
shall be noted on the record."
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filed and that an affidavit of defense would be required in
fifteen days to prevent judgment. However, the copy of the
statement which the defendant's attorney took from the record
contained an endorsement of such notice requiring the affidavit
of defense to be filed and the court held that the receipt of this
copy was a waiver of service just as his appearance before the
return day would be a waiver of service of the summons. Judgment had been entered in this case against the defendant for
want of an affidavit of defense. The defendant's petition to
strike off the judgment alleged as its sole reason that the judgment was not warranted by any statute or rule of court. The
rule to strike off was discharged. This decision may be supported upon the technical' ground that, as the copy filed of record
was intended for the defendant and the defendant's attorney
actually took it from the record as his copy and filed the
acknowledgment of its receipt, this is not a waiver of service
but an actual acceptance of service. As the court points
out in the opinion cited, counsel for the defendant might have
examined the statement filed of record and if he had not taken
it out, no judgment could have been entered against his client
by default. It would seem, therefore, that the rule in Luzerne
County. adopted under the former practice, will no longer be
effective under the Practice Act of 1915.
In another decision of Judge Woodward 7- a very drastic
penalty was imposed on a defendant for failure to "serve a
copy of the affidavit of defense in violation of the provision
of section 12, providing that it (the affidavit of defense) shall
be served upon the plaintiff or his attorney. The plaintiff took
a rule for judgment on account of the failure of the defendant to serve on the plaintiff the affidavit of defense "by copy
or otherwise." The defendant's only excuse was that the Practice Act was new; but as this section of the act had been considered by the court in another case 7 the rule was made
absolute.
"Boyle v. McNelis, unreported. Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne
County. June Term. 1916, No. 270.
"Undeiwood Typewriter Co. v. Pell, unreported, October Term, i9i,
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AFFIDAVIT OiF DEFENSE IN TRESPASS.

Although under section 13 the defendant in an action of
trespass is now obliged to file an affidavit of defepse, the legislature deemed it wise to distinguish this affidavit of defense
from the affidavit of defense in actions of assumpsit. In assumpsit the defendant must specifically deny each allegation of
fact in the statement of claim or else under section 8 he will
be presumed to have admitted its truth, and, under section 17,
failure to file an affidavit of defense or a sufficient affidavit of
defense may result in judgment against the defendant. The
affidavit of defense in trespass is an entirely different pleading.
It merely requires the defendant to deny averments in the statement "of the person" by whom the act was committed, the
agency or employment of such person, the ownership or possession of the vehicle, machinery, property or instrumentality inVOlved and of all similar avernenlts. " T If these are not denied,
they are taken to be admitted. The defendant need not deny
the averments of other facts on which the plaintiff relies -1 to
establish liability nor the averments relating to damages. Failure to file an affidavit of defense does not entitle the plaintiff
to judgment but under section i8 if the defendant fails to file
the affidavit of defense within the required time the case shall
be deemed to be at issue and may be ordered on the trial list.
The opini.on is freely expressed that in actions of trespass the
defendant ought to have been required to file an affidavit of
defense as in the action of assumpsit and his failure to deny
specifically all allegations in the plaintiff's statement of claim,
except those relating to the amount of damages claimed, should
have been tantamount to an admission of their truth, and plainNo. i8o8. This case seems to have arisen before the Practice Act went
into effect, it may be. therefore. that a local rule of court similar to- the
provision of section 12 was in force.
In Walsh v. James. supra. note ;o, Judge Strauss interprets this section of the act to mean averments in the statement of "the identity of"
the person, etc.

The phrase "all similar averments" is one which has not yet been
judicially interpreted. It is an undesirable phrase but seems thus far to
have done no harm; but see page 455.
' But see page 454.
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tiff should have been given the right to take judgment against
the defendant for want of an affidavit of defense or for want
of a sufficient affidavit of defense, s0 leaving only the amount
of damages to be determined by the jury."1 Under the practice prescribed by the Practice Act. the plaintiff is in every case
obliged to bear the burden of proof even where the defendant
has admittedly no defense. The facts showing negligence which
the plaintiff must allege are facts which the defendant'should
be obliged to answer as well as the facts specifically mentioned
in section 13, yet under this section he is not obliged either to
deny or to admit such avernents8 2 The defendant has the
opportunity to speculate on the ability of the plaintiff to prove
Iib case with sufficient particularity at the trial and to move
for a nonsuit in case the plaintiff fails. While it is obvious
that the plaintiff should not recover unless he is able to make
out a perfect case at the trial, there may be many instances in
which the plaintiff may, through the usual delay before trial,
be prevented from proving a good case although if the trial had
taken place at once he might have been able to do so. In such
cases, although the defendant has absolutely no defense, he
may be able to nonsuit the plaintiff, whereas if the defendant
has been obliged to file an affidavit of defense, the plaintiff
"Hammon

v.

lanmon, (4 Pitts. 537 (1916i. s. c. 14 Del. i6o.

Ellis

v. Suffalo & Lake Eric Traction Co.. supra, note &;. The late Judge Michael
Ariold, who was principal sponsor for the Procedure Act of

1

7, strongly

advocated this practice, see his address on Law Reform, 44 Legal Intelligencer 4. It uas also proposed in bills presented to the legislature in 191,3
(H. B. 455, Sec. 8), and 1915 (I1. B. 13.3. Sec. 23).
" By amendment of the act following hLrein the English (0. 13, R. 5),
and Ontario (R. 39) practice, the right to take such judgment might bi±
given, leaving the amount of damages to be assessed either by the common-

law writ of inquiry or in accordance with the Act of May 22. 1722, Sec.
-, i Smith's Laws 144. It would seem that the practice wider the Act
of i7z_, whereby the damages may be assessed by court and jury, should
be preferred to the old writ of inquiry whereby the damages are assessed
by a sheriff's jury. but the procedure under the Act of 17z, is practically

obsolete in Philadelphia. and, as stated in the case of MacHenry v. Railway Co.. 14 W. -N. C. 408

(184):

"In

Philadelphia it is the uniform

practice not to assess damages under this act except where, judgment having
been taken by default against one or more defendants, issue is joined as
to the others, or where judgment is given at the trial for not complying
with orders for the production of books and papers.'
'Hammon
V. Hammon, supra, note 8o.
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might have had judgment without going to trial. The reasofs
in support of the provisions of section 13 of the act and against
the assimilation of the practice in assumpsit and trespass given
by Judge Ralston '- are substantially three in number. First,
that as the facts not infrequently give rise to a criminal as well
as a civil liability, the defendant would probably claim that he
was not obliged to make answers which might incriminate him.
The illustration given in support of this objection is that where
a person is killed by the negligent driving of a motor vehicle,
the driver may be guilty of manslaughter and in a civil action
for damages cannot be compelled to disclose in his pleadings
facts which might result in his conviction of that crime. But,
under the present law, if he fails to deny that he was the driver
Of the machine, this fact will he taken to be admitted, but this
admission being nierely the result of a rule of pleading could
not be proved against the defendant in a criminal prosecution.
Similarly. if the defendant failed to deny the other acts constituting negligence which resulted in this accident, it is difficult to see why they should not be taken to be admitted with
the same force and effect. If the defendant denies that he was
the driver or denies the negligent acts, he is obviously not in
any danger of disclosing "in his pleadings facts which might
result in his conviction of the crime," and if he fails to deny
such allegations it is difficult to see why the defendant should
not be entitled to a judgment fol lowed by an assessment of
damages. The second reason given is that the "defendant may
have no knowledge of the facts, in which case the affidavit
would consist: merely of an averment of lack of knowledge or
a general denial." It seems that there ought to be no difficulty
in such case in following the rule in affidavits of defense in
assumpsit as laid down by judge Barratt 14 that where the
defendant has no knowledge or means of knowledge, an averment of ignorance and demand of proof is equivalent to a
denial of the allegation in the statement; but where the defend'See
'Beck

address referred to. supra, note ii.
v. Kauffman, supra. note -9%
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ant has knowledge or means of knowledge, he should be required to answer specifically. The third reason alleged is "that
the defense likely to be made in an action for negligence or
trespass is almost always obvious." This may be true where
there is a defense but where there is no defense. why should
the plaintiff not be entitled to judgment at once? Furthermore, where there is a defense, why should it be left to inferonce because it is "almost always obvious" and why should
not the defendant be obliged to set it forth specifically? The
framers of the act objected to inferences in pleading in section
5,why should inferences be sufficient under section 13?
All that has been said heretofore refers as well to the
actions for slander and libel as to other actions of trespass.
and in these actions there should likewise be the penalty of
judgnent for failure to file an affidavit or a sufficient affidavit
of defense to be followed by assessment of damages.
As heretofore suggested I'- the affidavit of defense in trespass is not an entirely new thought in Pennsylvania practice.
A number of counties had rules of court requiring the defendant at the request of the plaintiff to file a bill of particulars in
an action of trespass setting forth his grounds of defense, 0
ad so far as the writer is advised, these rules of court worked
no ]ardship on the defendant and raised none of the questions
that were suggested by Judge Ralston as objections to this
practice. The only ground upon which this practice has now 87
been declared improper is that the court has technically no
power to require such bill of particulars because it is a practice
unknown at common law either in England or in Pennsylvania,
and, since under the Procedure Act of 1887 the defendant
in an action of trespass was not required to do more than plead
..not guilty," the rule of court requiring such defendant to
furnish a bill of particulars in addition to the plea of "not
64 U. otF P.%.

L.Aw

REVIEW, pp).25b-257. and notes.

'A

list of such rulez is given in the paper books in the case of Kelly
See opinion of the lower
v. nhe Pennsylvania Co.. 2.3 Pa. 53 (1916).
court. 63 Pitts. 716 (1915)'Kelly

v. Penna. Co.. .supra, note 86.
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guilty" was deemed of doubtful validity 8 and was finally
declared to be invalid. s9 But this decision merely disposes
of the matter on purely technical grounds. No reasons justif ing the objection to the assimilation of the practice in actions
of assumpsit and trespass have, as yet, been brought to the attention of the writer.
A case arose in Luzerne County, 0 decided by Judge
Strauss, raising the question of the defendant's right to file
an affidavit of defense in an action of trespass after fifteen
(lays had expired from the date of service of the plaintiff's
statement of claim. Section 18 provides that where the defendant in trespass fails to .file an affidavit of defense within
the fifteen days, the case may be ordered on the trial list. But
here the plaintiff did not order the case on the trial list and
long before the trial list was made up and before the case
was ordered down by the plaintiff but after the fifteen days
had expired, the defendant filed an affidavit of defense. The
plaintiff took a rule to show cause why this affidavit should
not be stricken from the record and the court held that
'.6.

.

as this affidavit was filed within reasonable time and

before any action was taken by the plaintiff and long before any
trial list could have been made up; and because it gives the plaintiff knowledge of the defense along the lines required to be set out
in the affidavit in this class of cases, under the discretion which
we have to permit amendments and extensions of time, we dismiss
this exception."
It is obvious that the affidavit of defense thus permitted
to be filed could not be filed as an amendment for there was
nothing on record to amend. Besides, as heretofore suggested,"' the court probably has no right to grant an extension
of time for filing a pleading under section 22 after the fifteen
days fixed by the act have expired. It is interesting to note
also that the court considers this affidavit of defense to have
been filed "within a reasonable time." In the present state of
".Mitchell on Motions and Rules (2d Ed.), p. .
"Kelly v. The Pennsylvania Co.. .supra, note 86.
"Walsh v. James, supra, note So.
" 64 U. OF PA. LAW REvIEW 266.
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the practice it is difficult to see how the reasonableness of
the time-within which the pleading is filed is entitled to any
consideration: furthermore the reason assigned by the court
that the affidavit of defense "gives the plaintiff knowledge of
the defense along the lines required," seems to beg the question for if no defense is allowed by reason of the failure to
file the affidavit of defense within the required time, is it
important that the plaintiff should be given knowledge of such
defense? The opinions of Judge Strauss on the Practice Act
are all marked by a strong desire to avoid rulings which would
restrict the right of the court to mold the procedure so as to
promote the justice of the case. 92
IWthat is perhaps the most important expression of judicial
opinion under this section, is to the effect that a defense in
law which might have been raised by demurrer and should now
be raised in the affidavit of defense, cannot be raised at the
trial if it has not been raised theretofore in the pleading. M
was killed by a railroad train; his widow died thereafter without having brought suit for damages for her husband's death,
and thereupon his children brought this suit for such damages.
At the trial the defendant raised the point that the plaintiffs
were not entitled to recover because under the -Act of April
26. 1855. P. L. 339. the right of action survived to the children only where there was no surviving widow. The court
was of this opinion but held that the defendant had no right
to set up this defense at the trial because, as the facts are
fully set forth in the statement of claim it became
the imperative duty of the defendant to set up its technical
defense thereto in its affidavit of defense. . . . It is immaterial
whether the allegations of fact on which the defense rests are to be
taken as admitted under the first clause of section 13, or whether
they are to be treated as at issue without answer or denial under
the final clause of the said section. In either case the defense intended to be offered at the trial must first be set up in the affidavit
of defense or it cannot be admitted."
The court further intimates that an amendment might
have been offered at the trial to meet the plaintiff's objection
-..

"See Ip. 447, 453, 466.
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to the admissibility of this defense. But as the case was finally
decided against the plaintiffs on the ground of the decedent's
contributory negligence, the views of the court on all these
practice points may be considered mere dicta. They are, nevertheless, important as expressions of opinion as to the scope of
the affidavit of defense in trespass and, if they are to be taken
as an interpretation of the phrase "and all similar averments,"
the opinion indicates the unexpected results that may follow
the use of such vague legislative phrases, the meaning and scope
of which must necessarily depend upon judicial interpreta93
tion.
SET-OFF AND COUNTER-CLAIM.

Did the legislature mean to establish any distinction between set-off and counter-claim? In discussing this question
heretofore 94 the writer came to the conclusion that in the
Pennsylvania cases no distinction seems to be made between
the terms set-off and counter-claim but that possibly some dis-.
tinction is now made by the Practice Act of 19i 5. Under this
act it is possible that a counter-claim may be pleaded upon a
cause of action which has arisen since the plaintiff brought suit
or which was acquired by the defendant since that time and
such claims, by analogy to the distinction made in England, 5
are, strictly speaking, counter-claims and not set-off. It is to
be noted that in every passage in the Practice Act set-off and
countei-claim are both mentioned except at the end of section 14. Section 2 twice refers to pleading "set-off or counterclaim." Section 6 and section 8 refer to the allegations in "setoff or counter-claim." The first part of section 14 provides
that the defendant may "set off or set up by way of counterclaim any right or claim." etc. Section 15 refers three times
to "set-off or counter-claim."
Section 17 twice speaks of
"set-off or counter-claim." Everywhere in the act set-off and
counter-claim are both mentioned and in the disjunctive, always
"Miller v.Penna. . R. Co., -9 York
*U. oF P-. L.w REVIEw 257.
Annual Practice, 19T4, pp. 366-367.

2oo

(r9i6), s. c. 6 Lehigh 4o7.
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set-off or counter-claim, and in section 15, in the endorsement
of the affidavit of defense, the plaintiff is directed to "reply to
the within set-off (or counter-claim as the case may be).". This
would clearly indicate that the legislature recognized some distinction between set-off and counter-claim. What this distinction is has, unfortunately, not been set forth and as above
stated cannot be found in the cases. But the caption of section
14 is "Set-off and Counter-Claim." No doubt this was a mere
oversight on the part of the draftsmen of the act due to their
copying rule 56 of the Philadelphia rules of court. But the last
sentence of section 14 is significant in that it twice mentions
counter-claim without set-off. "If in any case in which the
defendant sets up a counter-claim the action of the plaintiff is
discontinued, dismissed or a voluntary nonsuit suffered, the
counter-claim nevertheless may be proceeded with." What is
the effect of this section of the act? Suppose the defendant in
his affidavit of defense pleads a set-off and plaintiff' chooses
to suffer a voluntary nonsuit, is the law -as heretofore 96 that
the plaintiff has the right to do so and that the defendant's only
remedy is to begin a new action against the plaintiff based oil
his claim of set-off? 97 If the defendant had set up a counterclaim and the plaintiff suffered a voluntary nonsuit, the counterclaim nevertheless may be proceeded with. Apparently this new
privilege given to the defendant does not extend to cases where
he defends on the ground of set-off. Since there has apparently heretofore been no distinction between counter-claim and
set-off the purpose of the apparent distinction set up in the
latter portion of section 14 is mysterious, unless it shall be held
to refer to such counter-claims above referred to, which could
'McCredy v. Fey. 7 Watts 496 (1838).
ITn the case of Lamb v. Greenhouse. 5 Superior Court 329 (1915),
it was decided that under Philadelphia Rule 57, which is in form similar
to this section of the act. where the plaintiff enters a discontinuance he
does so subject to -the reasonable condition of the rule that the counterclaim may nevertheless be proceeded with. The court leaves the question
undecided whether the rule would apply where the plaintiff had discontinued

by express leave of court or whether the rule wa- valid so far as it
relates to voluntary nonsuit. In this respect the phraseology of section 14
of the act differs from that of the Philadelphia rule of court. -
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not heretofore have been pleaded and which may now perhaps be set up by defendant, or unless the mystery may be more
.simply solved by the suggestion that the draftsmen of the act
copied without much thought the Philadelphia rule of court 1)
which in turn was based upon an English rule,"' without noting
that under the English practice there is a distinction between
whereas in Pennsylvania there
set-off and counter-claiin,'
appears no such distinction. Practically a defendant may in
every case get the benefit of this section of the act by calling
his new matter "counter-claim" and not using the term "setolff.

COUNTER-CLAIM

IN A.N ACTION OF TRESPASS.

May the defendant counter-claim in an action of trespass where the plaintiff has his election to sue either in assumpsit or trespass and has chosen to sue in trespass? This
involves the question whether the plaintiff by choosing a form
of action may deprive the defendant of a defense which lie
might otherwise have made, had the form of action been different or whether the right of the defendant depends upon
determination of what is the essential basis of the plaintiff's
cause of action. i. e., breach of duty or breach of contract. What
is the ultimate test by which this shall be determined? This
is a problem which at this time can only be suggested without being discussed at length. Attention may be directed to
the fact that in England and in Ontario a claim founded on
tort may be opposed to one founded on contract or vice -versa0 '
and there seems to be no essential reason why this should not
be allowed. But the act seems to settle this question by its
terms in limiting the right of the defendant to plead set-off or
counter-claim in actions of assumpsit, so that it would seem

" Rule 57.
"0.

21,

R. x6.
19T4, pp.

366-367.

'Annual

Practice,

''0.

RR. Ti,j2: Annual Practice, 1914. p. 317; see also rules of

2r,

practice and procedure in the Supreme Court of Ontario. 1913, page 25,
rule 113.
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that the plaintiff by choosing to sue in trespass may deprive the
defendant of this right irrespective of the essential basis of the
action.
PLAINTIFF'S ATTACK ON INSUFFICIENT SET-OFF OR COUNTER-

CLAIM.

In a case arising in the Court of Common Pleas No. 2, of
Philadelphia County,' ' the defendant did not deny the plainliff's claim but defended on the ground of set-off and counterclaim. The plaintiff took two rules for judgment, a rule for
judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense and another rule for judgment for the amount as to which the affidavit of defense was insufficient. Judge Barratt found that a
part of the counter-claim was good in law and, therefore, since
no reply was filed thereto, pro tanto a good defense but that
the plaintiff was entitled to judgment for the balance of his
claim. The court, therefore, discharged the rule for judgment
for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense and made the rule
for judgment for the amount of the claim as to which the
affidavit of defense was insufficient absolute. A question of
practice is suggested by this case. If the plaintiff, instead of
taking a rule for judgment had filed a reply under section i5
of the act and had in such reply by way of demurrer to the
counter-claim raised the same question of law that was here
raised by his rule for judgment, could the court have entered
the same judgment or would the plaintiff as to that portion of
the counter-claim held sufficient by the court, have had the
right by analogy to the proceedings in section 20 of the act
to file a supplemental reply within fifteen days for the purpose
of raising an issue of fact? In the case above cited the court
virtually gave judgment for the defendant on a portion of his
counter-claim and set this off against the judgment for the
plaintiff on his entire claim, thus leaving a balance in favor of
the plaintiff as a result of this set-off of judgment again
judgment. This was made possible because plaintiff attacked
" Beck v. Kauffman, supra, note -29.
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defendant's counter-claim by a rule for judgment and failed to
file a reply. If he had filed a reply, it would seem that he
could have had the question of law determined without running
the danger of having what was virtually a judgment in favor
of the defendant as to that portion of the counter-claim which
the court held sufficiently pleaded. Apparently the plaintiff has
his choice of procedure: if he takes a rule for judgment it may
le treated as a common-law demurrer and a final judgment on
the controversy may e entered, but if lie raises the same question by a reply lie should, by analogy to the procedure in section 2o. be entitled in case of a ruling adverse to his contention. to file a supplemental reply and go to a jury.
Another question is here suggested. In the above-cited
case the counter-claim found to be sufficiently pleaded was less
than the amount of the plaintiff's claim. But if the defendant
admits the plaintiff's claim and sets up a counter-claim larger
than the amount of the plaintiff's claim, to which counter-claim
the plaintiff files a reply, may judgment be entered for the
plaintiff? In support of a negative answer it might be said that
this would give the plaintiff a judgment in the face of a defense of counter-claim for which the defendant might eventually get judgment against the plaintiff, leaving a balance in
favor of the defendant. This is the view taken by Judge
Hause of Chester County'*" in a case in which the defendant
filed an affidavit of defense which was insufficient as to the
plaintiff's claim but set up an apparently valid counter-claim:
The plaintiff took a rule for judgment "notwithstanding the
affidavit of defense." 104 The court discharged the rule on the
ground that it was not authorized by the Practice Act, saying
that the result would be a judgment for the plaintiff and followed, if the defendant should ultimately recover on his counter-claim. by a judgment for the defendant. The court states
"Farmers
& Breeders' Mutual Reserve Fund v. Elliott, unreported,
Court of Conmon Pleas, Chester County. August Term, i916, No. 87.
""A rule for judgment notwithstanding the affidavit of defense was
talen in the case of McFadden v. The Publishing Co., 12 Schuyl. 416 (g1i6),
and held not to be a proper method of attacking a statutory demurrer.
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that prior to the passage of the Practice Act where set-off or
counter-claim was in excess of the plaintiff's demand and suffi-

ciently pleaded there was no authority for the entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiff even though his claim wereadmitted to be due and there is nothing in the act which
indicates any legislative intent to change this practice. He
concludes by saying that if the set-off or counter-claim were
less in amount than the plaintiff's claim, judgment could be
given to the plaintiff for the difference and the cause might
then proceed until the validity of the counter-claim is determined by a jury. And if at that time the counter-claim prevails,
the plaintiff would recover nothing further, and, if otherwise,
he would obtain a verdict for such additional amount as the
jury might find."' On the other hand it may be argued that
judgment should be immediately given to the plaintiff, as his
claim is not denied, in order that he may be able to obtain a
lien on defendant's property to protect his judgment until the
defendant's counter-claim has been disposed of. Execution on
such judgment in favor of the plaintiff should be stayed until
after the trial of the defendant's counter-claim.
It would seem from the opinions hereinbefore cited that
the rule for judgment can no longer be used freely in attacking
the affidavit of defense when the defendant pleads set-off or
counter-claim, and it remains to be determined, if possible, to
what extent the attack must be made in the reply and to what
extent the rule for judgment may still be used. The demurrer
to set-off or counter-claim is. of course, out of the question, for
whether the counter-claim be considered as defendant's statement of claim or as part of the affidavit of defense, an attack
by demurrer would be bad practice, for section 4 of the act
'"

Roberts v. Sharp. 161 Pa. 185 ( 1894) : Beck v. Kauffman. supra, note

-g. It is intimated in the case of Farmers & Breeders' Mutual Reserve
:und v. Elliott. supra. note io3. that in the light of other facts stated in
1he affidavit of defense, it might be assumed that the counter-claim was
invalid, but since its invalidit" was not challenged either by an answer
filed (presumably this would he plaintiff's reply) or by rule for judgment
on the whole record notwithstanding the counter-claim and the affidavit of
defense tthis suggests an entirely novel procedure in Pennsylvania). the
court did not feel justified in assuming such invalidity and dismissed the
plaintiff's rule for judgment.
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abolishes denmurrers to statements or claim and in Pennsylvania
practice demurrers to the affidavit of defense were never allowed.
In place of the demurrer to the affidavit of defense the
practice arose of taking a rule for judgment for want of a
sufficient affidavit of defense whether the defense set up was
legal or equitable. Under this rule the court could give final
julngment against the defendant, and as this practice is specifirally recognized in section 17 of the Practice Act, the propriety
4f attacking an insufficiently pleaded set-off or counter-claim in
an affidavit of defense by taking a rule for judgment would
seem to be incontestable. But in view of the opinions above expressed, it would seem that the rule for judgment is now to be
considered as the plaintiff's appropriate method of attack only
in cases in which the defendant does not defend on ground of
set-off or counter-claim.1 00 If we assume a case in which the
defendant sets up three defenses, (i) a defense provable under
the plea of non-assumpsit, (2) one which is provable under the
plea of set-off, and (3) one which is essentially a counter-claim
in the popular. sense of the word, namely, a claim arising out
of an entirely different transaction and one which under the
present Practice Act might perhaps be set up even though it
had been acquired by the defendant since the action against him
was commenced, and if in such case the plaintiff desires to attack the entire affidavit of defense he should do so by a reply
coupled with a rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense; that is to say he might, after having set forth
a reply in compliance with the terms of the act, add a prayer
for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense. In
considering this question. Judge Fuller of Luzerne County 107
said:
'" Exceptions to affidavit of defense are recognized in Luzerne County.
What order can the court enter if such exceptions are sustained? May
judgment for plaintiff be given? The practice seems peculiar. Savitz v.
Mass. Bonding Co., C. C. P., Luzerne County, October Term, jtg6, No. ;7,
unreported.
" Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Gibbs Milling Co. iS Luzerne 467
(xiq6); s. c. 33 Lane. 402; 14 Del. 193; 30 York io9: 34 Lanc. 402.
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"'We are not clearly informed by the act what course to pursue or how the question of law should he presented when the chal-

lenged statement of the counter-clain in the affidavit of defense is
such that under the former practice it would be held insufficient
on a rule for judgment. We incline, however, to the opinion and
so we decide, resolving the doubt in favor of the defendant, on a
consideration of sections 1 and 17. that the plaintiff should file a
reply raising the question of law and then the court could dispose
of the case on the whole record on motion of either party. This
is one of the uncertainties liable to arise under the Practice Act
which should perhaps be obviated by new rules of court under section 23, but for the present we prefer not to make new rules of
court and accordingly further proceedings in the case are postponed until the plaintiff shall have filed his reply to the counterclaim."
This decision applies the principle of section 20 to the attack on the counter-claim. There is. of course, no reason why
the counter-claim should not be attacked by rule for judgment
except the view of the court that the provision of section 15
of the act "that the plaintiff shall file an answer under oath
which shall be called the 'Plaintiff's Reply,'" makes it obligatory on the plaintiff to file a reply to a counter-claim and that
being so, by necessary inference, makes the reply the only
vehicle by which the plaintiff can attack the counter-claim either
by denial of its facts or by reason of its insufficiency in law.
The court, in the case above cited, seems to admit the difficulty
of the question and reaches its conclusion apparently with some
hesitation.
PROOFS UNDER THE PLFADINGS.

Section i6 provides that neither party shall be permitted
at the trial to make any defense which is not set forth in the
affidavit of defense or the plaintiff's reply as the case may be,
except as provided in sections 7 and 13. Under the old practice
the defendant was not limited in his proof to the facts set forth
in his affidavit of defense and in order that the plaintiff might
be fully advised as to the entire defense he could call on the
defendant for a bill of particulars. This practice has survived
in many of the counties of the state. On the other hand the
defendant who desired to prove matters not strictly admissible
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under his pleas was permitted to do so. if he gave notice of
special matter which may or may not have been set forth in
his affidavit of defense. When county rules were adopted providing that the defendant was limited in his proofs to the defense set forth in his affidavit of defense, the reason for the
older practice permitting notice of special matter and permitting plaintiff to ask for a bill of particulars disappeared and
this is now especially true in view of the provision of section
i6 of the act. The pleadings are defined by section 2 of the
act. Their contents are prescribed by section 5. By section 16
the parties are limited in their proofs to the allegations made in
these pleadings, therefore under the provisions of the act a bill
of particulars to be filed by the defendant at the request of the
plaintiff is no longer necessary.10 8
The question may still be asked, however, whether the
plaintiff has any right to a more specific statement of a counterclaim Oleaded by the defendant in his affidavit of defense. This
is not the same as a request for a bill of particulars from the
defendant. The general practice is that the defendant may rule
the plaintiff to file a more specific statement of claim '9 and as
the counter-claim is under the terms of the act 110 the defendant's statement of claim, it should be open to attack by the same
or similar procedure on the ground that it is not sufficiently
specific.
DEMURRER AND ANSWER IN'THE AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENSE.

Section 4 abolishes demurrers and provides that questions
of law heretofore raised by demurrer shall be raised in the
affidavit of defense."' Section 2o amplifies this rule by providing that questions of law may be raised in the affidavit of
defense without answering the averments of fact in the state"Sturtevant

v. Regan. 64 Pitts. 715 (916).

Unless the decision of the Court of Common Pleas No. 4. in the
matter of Katzenberg v. Oberndorff. supra. note 22. shall establish the rule
that affidavit of defense must be used to secure this result instead of the
rule for more specific statement.
...
See end of section 15.
1 1
' McFadden v. Publ. Co.. supra, note io4.
'
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inent of claim and after such questions of law have been disposed of by the court against the defendant he may file a supplemental affidavit of defense to the averments of fact in the
statement. The question now arises whether the defendant may
demur and answer at the same time. Section 20 provides that
he may raise any question of law without answering the averments of fact. It is nowhere provided that he may not answer
the averments of fact at the same time that he raises the question of law. If the defendant demurs and answers in his affidavit of defense and the court decides against him on the question of law raised by way of demurrer, is lie entitled to the
additional fifteen days given under section 20 within which lie
may file a supplemental affidavit of defense to the averments
of fact? Under the older decisions it would seem that an attempt to demur and answer in the same pleading would result
in a ruling that the demurrer is waived by the answer." 2 A
different view, however, seems to be taken by Judge Endlich
oif Berks County.'3 3 He was of the opinion that where a defendant demurred and answered in his affidavit of defense the
court would refuse to consider the averments of fact, and lie
laid down the rule broadly that averments of fact may not be
introduced into a statutory demurrer nor will they be considered by the court, if so introduced. This is a principle apparently new to our practice, namely, that when the defendant
deniurs and answers at the same time, his answer must be
ignored, and if the demurrer is decided against him he may
file a stpplemental affidavit of defense.
PRACTICE ON STATUTORY DEMURRER.

When a defendant files a statutory demurrer, how shall
the matter be reached and disposed of by the court? 114 Treating the affidavit of l-fense which raises the question of law as
a statutory demurrer, the proper practice, by analogy to the
64 U. OF PA. L.%w REvIEw 246. note 66.
. Scidle v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.. 8 Berks 251 (i9i6).
..This question was in part considered in the former article on thiE
act, 64 U. OF PA. LAW REVIEW 242.

TIlE PEJ3NSYLVAIMIA PRACTICE ACT OF 1915

practice on a common-law demufrer. would be to have the case
set down for hearing on the demurrer. The cases, however,
show considerable diversity in the practice. In Cumberland
County and Berks County the question of law raised by the
affidavit of defense was disposed of on a rule entered by plain11 8
tiff for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense,
and in Fayette County on a motion for judgment for defendant on questions of law raised by the affidavit of defense.' 6 It
is obvious that the practice allowed in the cases in Cumberland
and Berks Counties is not proper. for even if the court decides
in favor of the plaintiff. lie is not entitled to judgment because
under the provisions of section 2o the defendant is entitled to
m additional fifteen days within which to file a supplemental
affidavit of defense. The practice in Fayette County seems
more appropriate but is after all unnecessary since from the
very character of the statutory demurrer all that need be done
is to set the matter down for hearing and the court may give
judgment for the defendant under section 20 although it cannot give judgment against him.
If the decision is against the defendant on his statutory
demurrer, the defendant is entitled to an additional fifteen days
within which to file a supplemental affidavit of defense. 1 , If
the first affidavit of defense was not a statutory demurrer but
a defense on the facts, the supplemental affidavit of defense may
be allowed, not, however, under the provisions of section 20 of
the Practice Act but under the older practice long established
in Pennsylvania whereby leave to file such supplemental affidavit
of defense is discretionary with the court."18 Section 17 provides
that "'the plaintiff may take a rule for judgment . . . and the
court shall enter judgment or discharge the rule, as justice may
'"Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co. v. Stambaugh, supra, note
The improper
(1.3: Dlingaman v. Directors of the Poor. 9 Berks -?7 (1916).

method ued in these cases was also used in a Philadelp~hia case without
criticism by the court. Courtenay v. Logue, 6 D. R. 13 (1916).
"Hackney v. Gorley. supra. note IT.
" Presumablv from the time that notice is given of the decision entered against him. 64 U. (IF PA. L.%w Rrvi-.w 243.
"'Andrews v. Blue Ridge Packing Co.. 2o6 Pa. 370 (19o3); Scranton
Flour & Grain Co. v. Maier, sfipra, note 41.
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require." Is the old practice under which the court could in its
discretion give leave to file a supplemental affidavit of defense
hereby abolished? Judge Strauss of Luzerne County seems to
have no doubt about the court's right in such cases, under the
broad authority given under sections 21 and 22, and he adds:
"it appears to us upon a reading of the whole statute that its purpose was not to bar any avenue leading to a just result previously
opened, but to straighten, shorten and accurately define the road.
Therefore. the court retains the right and ought to exercise the
power to permit the supplemental affidavit of defense where a real
defense appears probable. unless convinced that the original affidavit was merely evasive and not in good faith." "I
Although po leave need be given after disposition of the
defendant's statutory demurrer, nearly all of the courts seem
to have proceeded upon the theory that it is necessary for them
to give leave to file the supplemental affidavit of defense.' 2 0 In
one case,-'" however, the court, after deciding against the defendant on his statutory demurrer, made no order with reference to the filing of the supplemental affidavit of defense. This
would seem to be the appropriate practice. The defendant having received notice of the decision against him on his statutory
demurrer must file his affidavit of defense within fifteen days
without being either specially requested or permitted to do so.
Where the court decides against the defendant on his statutory demurrer, what order shall be entered? 122 In a case in
Westmoreland County,'-' the court having come to the conclusion that the statement of claim was insufficient but that if
it were amended it would be sufficient and defendant would not
be entitled to judgmenqt on his statutory demurrer, entered an
order giving plaintiff leave to amend his statement of claim
""Savitz v. Bonding Co., supra, note io6.
"The form in which such leave was given varies. In Seidle v. Fidelity
& Casualty Co.. supra, note 1-13, it is "that the defendant be at liberty to
file a supplemental affidavit of defense." In Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron
Co. v. Stambaugh. supra. note 0.-. it is "the defendant is directed to file a
supplemental affidavit of defense," etc. In Ballora v. Hayes, supra, note 44,
it is "defendant to file a supplemental affidavit of defense," etc.
" Hackney v. Gorley, supra, note 3t.
64 U. oF PA. LAw RE'EW 242, 243.
Ballora v. Hayes, supra, note 44.
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within fifteen days and upon the filing of such amended statement and payment of costs accrued, judgment. against the defendants ofi the points of law suggested in the affidavit of defense, with leave to the defendants to file a supplemental affidavit of defense to the avennents of fact of the statement within
fifteen days from the filing of such statement and in default
of filing the amended statement within the time specified, judgment for the defendants. It is submitted that the portion of
the order providing for judgment against the defendants on the
points of law suggested in the affidavit of defense is not good
practice. 2' It is not authorized by section 20 of the act which
contemplates the entry of some mere interlocutory order indicating that the question of law raised by the defendant is decided against him, such decision, however, not being a judginent. The order made in the case just cited is especially anomalous in that the entry of judgment against the defendant is
followed immediately by leave given to him to file a supplemental affidavit of defense. An appropriate form of order in
such cases might be "affidavit of defense stricken off" or "affidavit of defense insufficient" 123 or "upon the question of law
raised by the defendant's affidavit of defense, defendant is not
entitled to judgment" -Oor "legal objections raised by the defendant to the statement filed by the plaintiff in the above case
are overruled" 1'2or "judgment for defendant on affidavit of
defense refused." '2
The question of the form of the statutory demurrer has
been heretofore discussed."" It obviously cannot be drawn in
the form of an affidavit of defense and an appropriate form is
here suggested.'30
" An order entered in Luzerne County,'"judgment in favor of plaintiff
upon the question of law raised by the pleadings" is open to similar objection. Joseph Dixon Crucible Co. v. Kraft, C. C. P., Luzerne County, June

Term, gi6, No. 6.-, unrcported.

164 U. oF P.. Lw R aaw 243.

-'
Bingaman v. Directors of the Poor, supra, note xis.
& Reading Coal & Iron Co. v. Stambaugh, supra, note xis.
'Barto v. Shaffner, 9 Berks 2o (1916).
1'64 U. or P.%. L.w REIW 244.
"Following tlie beginning of the usual form of affidavit of defense,
1he defendant states that he has a full, true and lcgal defense to the plain'Phila.
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STRIKING PLEADINGS FROM THE RECORD.

The right given to the court in section 21, unon motion, to
strike from the record a pleading which does not conform to
the provisions of the act and to allow amendments or new plead.
ings to be filed upon such terms as it may direct, has been frequently exe'rcised and is referred to in a number of the reported
cases."' The question as to whether a statutory demurrer
might be treated as a motion to strike off a statement is decided
in the affirmative in Lancaster County 12 but contra in Berks
County. 3 3 In the latter case Judge Endlich disposed of this
objection which was raised in a statutory demurrer, by stating
that it should have been raised by motion to strike off the statement and lie refused judgment without making any order with
reference to the statement which had failed to comply with the
provisions of the act. This seems rather a technical decision
for although a statutory demurrer is not the same as a motion
to strike a pleading from the record, yet as its purpose is to
obtain judgment on account of failure of the -plaintiff to set
forth a cause of action, it should, except on the purest technical
ground, be held to be tantamount to a motion to strike off on
the principle that the greater includes the less.
tiff's statement of claim of the following nature and character, to wit,
that the facts set forth in the statement of claim are insufficient in law
and do not constitute a good cause of action for the following reasons
(here set forth the objections specifically followed by the signature of the
affiant and the jurat). And a rule of court might require in analog' to
the older practice that the defendant shall swear that his statutory demurrer
is not intended for purpose of delay. This paper should be endorsed "affidavit of defense:' It is recommended that it should also be endorsed (statutory

demurrer).

" A statement in trespass not sworn to and not endorsed with notice
to file affidavit of defense was stricken off. Weber v. Consolidated Ice Co.,
64 Pitts. 223 (igi6). A statement not averring whether the contract was
written or oral was stricken off. Curtis v. Bortree, 17 Lack. 259 (i916).

A

statement containing many paragraphs setting forth unessential matter
lacking directness, alleging a trespass upon advice and belief was stricken
off, with leave to file a new pleading within three weeks. Weiss v. Schafer,
12 Schuyl. -0o9 (1916). A statement not paragraphed and numbered was
-stricken off with leave to file a new statement within thirty days. Cunfer
v. Smith. 14 Del. 1!6 (1916).

A statement not paragraphed or endorsed

with notice to defendant was stricken off, with leave, etc.
Grebe, 14 Del. 19o (i916).

Zullinger v.

A statement in trespass containing inferences

and conclusions was stricken off with leave.
note 3o.

'"Sorrick v. Scheetz, 33 Lane. 4o.
Barto v. Schaffner, 9 Berks 2o (i916).

Delaney v. Chester, supra.
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APPLICATION TO PENDING PROCEEMINGS.

Judge Endlich of the Court of Common Pleas of Berks
County 13' said:
"As pointed out in Thomas's Election. 198 Pa. 546, while
statutes governing procedure may reach pending litigation, the question when or how far any given statute of that class does so, is
one of legislative intent to be gathered from the language and terms
of the enactment, and to be negatived unless expressed or necessarily implied. In view of the abolition of the plea by section 3
of the Act of 191 5 , and its provision in section 2 for the formation
of the issue to be tried by declaration and affidavit of defense (and
reply thereto in certain cases), there is reason for inferring that the
procedure ordained was intended to apply to pending cases not at issue when the act went into operation. but there seems to be none
for holding that it applies retroactively to causes actually and
formally at issue before that time."
It is intimated in this opinion that the Practice Act does
apply to cases pending January 1, 1916, but not then at issue,1 35
and it is so ruled in a case in Delaware County."' 0

David lVcrner Antrain.
Law School,
University of Pennsylvania.
" Ahrens v. Reading, 8 Berks County L. J. 246 (1916).
" It has been decided that the t rocedure Act of 1887 applied to pending
cases. Krause v. Penna. Railroad Co.. 4 County Court Reports 6o (1887);
see also Swartz v. Lawrence, 12 Phila. 1~t (t81 ).
It was held in the
case of Smith v. Travilla, I Clark 78 (1842-). that the Act of 1842 applied
to pending suits.- When the legislature does not desire to have a new
procedural statute a.,lj to pending litigation, it usually protects such
cases by a proviso. This is illustrated by the Act of May t2, 18)7, P. L
62, Sec. I, relating to foreign attachment. In Luzene County the question
is set at rest by the following rules of court: "'I.In every action which
has been begun in this court, but in which no statement has been filed
before January 1, 1916, and in every case brought into this court by appeal
from a justice of the peace in which no special statement has been filed
before said date, the said act shall apply to all of the pleadings. 2. In
every such action in which a statement but no subsequent pleading has
been filed before said date. and in every case brought into this court by
appeal aforesaid in which a special statement but no subsequent pleading
has been filed before said date, it shall be optional with the plaintiff to
stand upon such statement subject to the former practice, or to file de novo
and serve a sworn statement as provided in said act, which shall then apply
to all of the subsequent pleadings. 3. In every such action and appeal
in which a statement and affidavit of defense have been filed, or in which
issue has been made by plea filed before said date. the former practice shall
apply. 4. In every case brought into this court by appeal aforesaid, after
said date, the transcript shall no longer be considered as the statement but
the plaintiff will be required to file a statement under said act which shall
apply to all of the pleadings:'
Delaney v. Chester, supra, note 3o.

GEORGE MIFFLIN DALLAS..
The Honorable George Mifflin Dallas was born February 7,
839, read law in the office of St. George Tucker Campbell, a leader
of the Philadelphia Bar, and was admitted to practice in i86o. While
a young man, Mr. Dallas was elected a member of the Constitutional Convention of 1872-73. His speeches on the law of libel
in Pennsylvania--"The Freedom of the Press"-in that convention
attracted attention and were published in pamphlet form. It may
be remarked here that .Mr. Dallas was an attractive speaker, indeed
an orator, with strength of thought, grace of diction and a very
agreeable voice. Those who listened to his brief address in the
United States court-room on "John Marshall Day," February 4,
i9oi, and who remembered the appearance of Judge Dallas as an
advocate in jury trials, noticed that his powers of elocution had
not failed from disuse.
Mr. Dallas practised law for some years in partnership with
Mr. George L. Crawford, who was a very able lawyer, and of
exceptionally clear judgment. The two men were warm friends
and older members of the Bar can readily picture the offices of
Crawford and Dallas on South Fourth Street, on the first floor
of two adjoining typical Philadelphia houses, where ample room,
high ceilings, and shelves filled with law books, seemed the arcana
of legal mysteries, but wherein law was practised with great ability
and with the observance of professional ethics and personal courtesy
according to those traditions which have made the widespread reputation of the Philadelphia lawyer. There was something impressive
in such offices, before the days of high buildings, with floor-space
rented by the square foot and in the absence of those useful adjuncts, the ever-tinkling telephone and the constantly ticking typewriter. Yet what is dignity contrasted with utility?
An instance of the confidence reposed in Mr. Dallas is to be
found in Go-aen's Appeal, io6 Pa. 288--more fully reported in
io \V. N. C. 85, an interesting and ciose case in which there was
a dissenting opinion by Trunkey, J., concurred in by Sharswood, C.
J., and Sterrett, J. The Court of Common Pleas No. 2, of Philadelphia, appointed Mr. Dallas master to preside at and supervise
the proceedings at a special meeting of the stockholders of the
Philadelphia and Reading Railway. held for the election of officers
and managers. The question in the case was whether such election
(470)
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was invalid by reason of the fact that less than a majority of the
stockholders attended in person or by proxy; but there was not
any criticism of the master. It was probably as an outcome of
his experience in that case that 'Mr. Dallas delivered an address
before the Law Academy, on January 15, 1884, on "The Law of
Procedure in Corporation Meetings." There seem to be few publications from his pen, but the conclusion of that paper well may
be quoted: "Any portion of the law which relts to corporations may demand your most careful investigation. The number
of these artificial persons has grown so great, under liberal statutory provisions for their creation, that it might almost be supposed
to be a mandate of the law that they shall increase and multiply;
and they form so important a class of our business community
that no lawyer can safely omit to instruct himself upon any matter
which concerns them; they have become our chief bankers, transporters, manufacturers and miners; they build and navigate our
ships; construct and operate our telegraphs; and insure our property and titles, and our lives. They provide graves for our dead
bodies, and administer our estates; and, mindful of our immortal
part as well they include even the support of public worship within
the scope of their beneficence." These statements are fully as
pertinent now as they were in 1884. A little wave of sadness
creeps over the heart of the reader of the last words.
Mr. Dallas was the special master in the important and voluminous proceedings which were evolved in the first receivership
of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad. Ile wrote over thirty
reports and his judicial qualities were proved by his treatment of
the important matters which came before him. It was, thereiore,
with the hearty concurrence of the profession that he was appointed a judge of the Circuit Court of the United States, with
its wide jurisdiction, on March 17, 1892, which position he held
until his resignation, 'March ii, 19o9, and it is as a judge that he
will specially be remembered. Soon after he went on the -bench,
lie received the degree of LL.D. from Princeton University. In
his case this was a deserved honor, for he was indeed legum doctor
-a teacher of law. In his judicial bearing he was dignified, but
free from pomposity, attentive in hearing counsel, free from the
criticism, "An over-speaking judge is like an easily bent wand";
combining kindness, patience and courtesy with firmness. A natural
gift for mechanics was a help in the consideration of many cases
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which came before him in the Federal Court. He had no cacoethes
seribendi and his opinions were not mere digests. Perhaps one
of the most widely known was in Northern Securities Co. v. Harriman. 134 Fed. 331, in which he decided that the question therein
involved had not been decided in the great case of the Northern
Securities Co. v. U. S.. 193 U. S. 197, which discussed and determined the grave question of a combination in restraint of trade
and commerce. l lis opinion was afiirmed in Harriman v. Northern
Securities Co.. 197 U. S. 244.

A perusal of his statement of facts

and his conclusions will show the distinctive clarity of his mind.
After Judge Dallas ceased his active and successful work he
enjoyed his well-earned rest in congenial pursuits and recreations
until his physical failure some months ago.
Those who were admitted to his personal friendship were
won by the lovable traits which it seemed he could not help displaying in personal association, as well as by his marked humor.
lie told a funny anecdote in admirable fashion, had the happy
faculty of generously enjoying the wit or stories of other men and
was absolutely without tile pose of those who can appreciate nothing
witty that is not of their own utterance, whether it be original or
borrowed.
Our community has been blessed by the character, by the citizenship, by the judicial labors, by the personal worth of such a
man; and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania may
well be proud of his record as one of its teachers, while those
who loved him will never cease to hold his memory in respect
and unceasing affection.
John T. Patton.*
Emeritus Professor of Law,, University of Pennsylvania.
DEATIx OF loN. GEORGE MTIFFLIN DALLAS; RESOLUTION OF THE
FACULTY OF TIE L.xw SCHOOL.

The entry of a minute in memory of the Honorable George M.
Dallas, who (lied, distinguished and beloved, on January 21, 1917,

must be a recital in substance of the sincere tribute paid to him in
*This tribute to the memory of Judge Dallas was prepared by his colleague. Professor Patton, at the request of the Faculty of the Law School.
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the year i9o6. upon his retirement from active duty as a professor
in the Law School. Yet there is comfort in the thought that the
expression of esteem and affection was made known to him and not
delayed until he had passed from earthly ken.
The regret was then expressed that the Law School had lost
the praiseworthy service of a lawyer of great ability, learning and
high judicial position, whose reputation had added much to the
prestige of this department of the University. When he was sworn
in on March 22, 1892, as a judge of the Circuit Court of the United
States, under the Act of Congress of March 3, i89i, which brought
into existence nine appellate tribunals, an interesting item in the
Legal Intelligenccr, which gave notice of the ceremony, stated that
it "was witnessed by a large assemblage of the bar and the students
of the Law Department of the University in which Judge Dallas
is a professor." This evidence of the regard in which he was held
by those who were honored by his instruction was maintained continuously during his entire tenure of his chair, for fifteen years in
all.
It is easy to believe that his study as a teacher must have aided
him in reaching those clear and logical rulings which marked his
career on the bench; and that, on the other hand, his practical administration of the principles of law and nice distinctions on points
of evidence were of great value to him in the preparation of his lectures to students.
The following causes of regret were stated:
That our students were deprived of the benefit of his teaching
and the example of his dignified and courteous bearing.
That his colleagues of the faculty would no longer have his
wise counsel, the fruit of his wisdom and experience, which was so
often asked and gladly received and followed.
Yet it was a gratification to know that the Trustees of the University elected Judge Dallas Professor Emeritus, that he accepted
that position and that his name and interest would still benefit the
University.
Yet beyond all appreciation of his official relation to this School,
le evoked and kept, on the part of his colleagues in the faculty, a
warm affection, which made the too rare occasions of meeting him
since his retirement sources of great pleasure; and it is with unfeigned sorrow that we realize that we shall see his face no more or
respond to his genial greetings and feel the influence of the personal
charm which has secured him so many friends.

